Both human infants and nonhuman primates can recognize unfamiliar entities as instrumental agents ascribing to them goals and efficiency of goal-pursuit. This competence relies on movement cues indicating distal sensitivity to the environment and choice of efficient goal-approach. Although dogs' evolved sensitivity to social cues allow them to recognize humans as communicative agents, it remains unclear whether they have also evolved a basic concept of instrumental agency. We used a preferential object-choice procedure to test whether adult pet dogs and human toddlers can identify unfamiliar entities as agents based on different types of movement cues that specify different levels of agency. In the navigational agency condition, dogs preferentially chose an object that modified its pathway to avoid collision with obstacles over another object showing no evidence of distal sensitivity (regularly bumping into obstacles). However, in the goal-efficiency condition where neither object collided with obstacles as it navigated toward a distal target, but only 1 of them exhibited efficient goal-approach as well, toddlers, but not dogs, showed a preference toward the efficient goal-directed agent. These findings indicate that dogs possess a limited concept of environmentally sensitive navigational agency that they attribute to self-propelled entities capable of modifying their movement to avoid colliding with obstacles. Toddlers, in contrast, demonstrated clear sensitivity to cues of efficient variability of goal-approach as the basis for differentiating, attributing, and showing preference for goal-directed instrumental agency.
.
The difference between dogs' special sensitivity to communicative and referential signals of human agents and their relatively limited understanding of causal and physical properties of inanimate objects raises questions concerning their understanding of agency. Although responsiveness to social communicative signals appears to indicate an ability to recognize an object as a communicative agent, the ability to identify instrumental agency-that necessarily involves object-related and often goal-driven, efficient behavior of the agent-remains a largely unexplored aspect of dogs' competence.
In human infants, instrumental agency is recognized and attributed to self-propelled objects on the basis of goal-directed autonomously generated variable and efficient actions (Gergely & Jacob, 2012) . Agentive actions imply two distinct types of distal sensitivity as pointed out by Leslie's theory of actional agency (Leslie, 1994) . On the one hand, agents move around by exhibiting distal sensitivity in space to their physical environment. This is evidenced by their ability to adaptively modify their path of motion while navigating in their environment in order to avoid collision with approaching objects or bumping into obstacles blocking their way. We define this minimal construal of actional agency as the concept of navigational agency. This generic tendency to avoid collision can be construed as an intrinsic and stable dispositional property that specifies (and is presupposed by) navigational agency. This serves the basic survival function of animate agents to avoid physical injury and maintain bodily integrity over time and across situations.
On the other hand, instrumental agency also exhibits distal sensitivity in time to some future state of reality (the goal state) that the action serves to bring about (Leslie, 1994) . This property is evidenced by the ability of instrumental agents to approach a distal goal object by choosing to perform the most efficient means action available in the given situation to realize the goal state (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gergely & Jacob, 2012) . We define this level of instrumental agency as goaldirected agency, which implies ascription of a distal goal and evaluation of action efficiency in relation to the specific goal object approached within the physical constraints of the environment. In the case of goal-directed agency the disposition to avoid colliding with nearby obstacles functions as a proximal subgoal that forms a necessary precondition for engaging in efficient pursuit of the more distal final goal that an instrumental agent may have set out to achieve. Consequently, apart from satisfying the requirements of navigational agency the attribution of goal-directed agency requires the identification of a distal goal. In contrast, one can recognize and attribute 'navigational agency' solely on the basis of observing adaptive modification of motion pathway to avoid impending collision with objects in the agent's environment.
It may be significant from an evolutionary perspective that selection for focal sensitivity to navigational agency might be sufficient to identify the relevant properties of agent kinds that are of primary significance in the ecological niche of many animal species dominated by predator-prey relationships including dogs. For example, for a predator to detect a potential prey and anticipate its changing movements in the local environment during the chase, the predator may need only recognize the target animal as a navigational agent who is avoiding collision with nearby obstacles during its escape; the predator may obtain little further advantage by attributing goal-directed actions to potential preys.
In contrast, understanding and expecting efficient adaptation of goal-directed behavior as a function of changing situational constraints has been shown to form the basis of human infants' ability to attribute goal-directed agency (Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Phillips, & Wellman, 2005) . Gergely and Csibra's (2003) theory of teleological stance proposed that when ascribing goals to instrumental actions of others, 12-month-old infants rely on their naïve theory of rational agency, which presupposes the choice of an efficient goal approach. Since then, evidence has accumulated demonstrating that even infants as young as 3 months of age can manifest sensitivity to goal-efficiency of action choice (see Caron, 2009; Gergely & Jacob, 2012; Skerry, Carey, & Spelke, 2013) .
However, we know relatively little about other species' abilities for agency attribution. On the basis of the theory of teleological stance (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) , it has been hypothesized that sensitivity to action efficiency may have evolved as a key component of agency attribution in other nonhuman animal species as well. This view has received empirical support from recent comparative studies suggesting that different primate species (rhesus macaques- Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & Gallese, 2008; orangutans-Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; chimpanzees-Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007) can differentiate between outcomes brought about in efficient versus inefficient ways (Call, Hare, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004) . The presence of similar abilities in dogs, however, is controversial. Range, Virányi, and Huber's (2007) demonstration of selective imitation of a novel means action in dogs was used to argue for an understanding of efficient goal approach. However, Kaminski et al. (2011) could not replicate these findings and Kupán et al. (2011) reported that, at least when tested in a social action demonstration context, dogs exhibited apparent efficiency blindness (i.e., they failed to discriminate between efficient and inefficient goal-directed actions).
Selective responsiveness to cues of goal-efficiency versus navigational agency involve, however, different aspects of instrumental agency and it should be noted that all of the above mentioned studies tested for the-more encompassing-concept of 'goaldirected agency.' By demonstrating sensitivity to goal-efficiency these studies by necessity also tested for distal sensitivity to the local environment (i.e., for navigational agency). Note, however, that it is a distinct evolutionary possibility that some nonhuman species may have evolved a minimal concept of navigational agency without the further ability to attribute distal and/or nonobservable goals to the agent.
The central aim of the present study, therefore, was to operationalize agency attribution in a way that would allow for the differentiation and separate testing of dogs' sensitivity to cues of navigational agency on the one hand, and goal-directed agency on the other. We also aimed to investigate whether the novel paradigm we adopted is sensitive enough to demonstrate differentiation of goal-directed agency on the basis of cues of goal-efficiency when applied to human toddlers. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Experiment 1-Sensitivity to Navigational-and GoalDirected Agency in Dogs
In the first experiment, we investigated whether dogs can attribute agency to unfamiliar moving objects on the basis of distal sensitivity to nearby objects in their environment (navigational agency condition) or on the basis of action efficiency in relation to a distal goal (goal-efficiency condition). Distal spatial sensitivity was operationalized as the ability to avoid collision with potential obstacles in one's path while navigating the local environment, whereas action efficiency was operationalized as approaching a distal goal object through the shortest possible route available in the situation, based on previous infant studies (Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely et al., 1995) . In the navigational agency condition, dogs saw two unfamiliar plush toys (T Agent [T A ] vs. T Non-agent [T NA ]) as they moved across a room with an obstacle in the middle of their pathway. T A always made a detour around the obstacle. In contrast, T NA first always bumped into the obstacle, thus unlike T A , T NA exhibited no distal sensitivity to the local environment. In the goal-efficiency condition dogs saw exactly the same patterns of equifinal movements performed by the two moving objects, but they approached a goal object (a ball), and neither of them bumped into the roadblock, because the obstacle had been removed before the trials with T NA . Therefore, neither of the two objects showed the lack of distal sensitivity, but only T A approached its target on the shortest possible route (going around the barrier by necessity), whereas T NA made an inefficient detour (taking the same roundabout path, even though no barrier was there).
Previous findings showed that dogs preferentially explore, approach and tend to stay closer to an object that they recognize as an agent (Gergely et al., 2015; Gergely, Petró, Topál, & Miklósi, 2013; Kubinyi et al., 2004) . On the basis of these findings, we used a two-alternative forced choice task to test whether an object that has been recognized as an agent is preferred over an alternative nonagentive object. We assumed that dogs and toddlers would preferentially approach an agent than a nonagent because the properties attributed to the agentive entity represent more relevant information that is significant for them in their ecological niche.
We hypothesized that if dogs can attribute navigational agency based on distal sensitivity to the environment, they will prefer to choose T A over T NA in the navigational agency condition as T A avoids bumping into objects in its environment. However, if dogs possess a more refined understanding of goal-directed agency, they will show the same preference in the goal-efficiency condition because unlike T NA , T A exhibits efficient goal-directed behavior while approaching its goal.
Method
Subjects. Adult pet dogs (n ϭ 81) were recruited from the database of the Department of Ethology, Eötvös Loránd University. A subject was allowed to participate in the study only if it could be motivated by moving objects and it was not in heat at the time of the experiment.
Some dogs were excluded from the experiment either due to inattention during the observational learning phase (navigational agency, n ϭ 6; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 10) or because they failed to select either target objects in the first trial (navigational agency, n ϭ 2; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 1). Additional dogs were excluded from the final analyses because of inaccurate demonstration due to a technical problem with the radio-controlled car (navigational agency, n ϭ 6; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 8), due to experimenter error (navigational agency, n ϭ 1; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 2) or because the owner did not act in line with the instructions (navigational agency, n ϭ 3; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 1). In one case both technical and experimenter error occurred during testing (goal-efficiency, n ϭ 1).
The dogs (n ϭ 40) that were included in the final analyses were evenly distributed over the two conditions (navigational agency, n ϭ 20, 11 males; age: M Ϯ SD ϭ 4.33 Ϯ 3.23 years; 11 different breeds; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 20, 8 males; age: M Ϯ SD ϭ 3.3 Ϯ 2.9 years, 14 different breeds).
Apparatus. Dogs were tested at the Department of Ethology, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest in a testing room (5.0 m ϫ 3.0 m) designed specifically for dog studies. Two plush toys, a rabbit (18 cm high and of beige color, see: S1) and a kangaroo (18 cm high and brown, see: S2) served as potential agents. Plush toys were mounted on a 16 ϫ 10 ϫ 10 cm radio-controlled car (UConvertor, Nikko). The RC car moved at a constant speed of 2 km/h; it was remote controlled by Experimenter 1. We used two different boxes (a white box: 22 ϫ 30 ϫ 25 cm and a black box: 20 ϫ 40 ϫ 15 cm) as roadblocks in the first and last four trials of the observational learning phase. In the goal-efficiency condition a tennis ball was used as a goal object for both moving objects (T A and T NA ).
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment the dog was led by the owner (who was present during the experiment) to a predetermined point in the middle line of the room. The dog was oriented toward the apparatus (at a distance of 2.5 m). Experimenter 1 (E1) stood facing the dog 1 m back from the middle line between the two locations X and Y, while Experimenter 2 (E2) stood next to the subject.
Familiarization trials (n ‫؍‬ 2). In the first two trials of Experiment 1, dogs were familiarized with the motion trajectory of the self-propelled objects. In this phase, there was no obstacle (roadblock) between the endpoints X and Y, thus the targets could move from location X to Y and location Y to X along a straight line. The distance between these endpoints was 2.5 m. At the beginning of each familiarization trial a plush toy (mounted on the RC car) stood at the starting point (location X for one of the plush toys or location Y for the other) and then started to move toward the end location (e.g., to location Y if the starting point was at location X and vice versa). Each dog saw both plush toys moving once across the scene and the starting point of the two plush toys (X or Y) was counterbalanced across subjects. Familiarization procedure was the same in both conditions, except that in the goal-efficiency condition a ball was placed at the end location which was always approached by the self-propelled entities in order to provide evidence for goal-directedness.
Observational learning trials (n ‫؍‬ 8). Navigational agency condition. In the next phase, one of the obstacles was placed halfway between location X and Y which hindered the plush toys from getting one location to the other on a straight trajectory. T A always made a detour around the roadblock, thus showed distal sensitivity and without a pause reached the end location. To add another agency cue (Csibra, 2008; Gergely, Petró, Topál, & Miklósi, 2013) , T A alternated its trajectory between trials. Namely, it first detoured around the barrier on the dogs' This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
side, then in the opposite direction, and this pattern was repeated in the subsequent trials. T NA in each trial bumped into the obstacle on its route (thus showed a lack of distal sensitivity), then reversed, stopped again, went forward and made a detour. T NA never alternated its motion trajectory, thus it always detoured the box on the dogs' side. After each trial, an opaque occluder (0.75 ϫ 1m) was placed by E2 (who stood slightly behind the dog) between the dog and the experimental setup to prevent the dog from witnessing the rearrangement of the scene. Then E1 changed the plush toy on the RC car and situated the roadblock to the appropriate position. After the fourth trial, the roadblock was also replaced by E1 with the other obstacle. This new obstacle was used for Trials 5-8 in order to demonstrate that the self-propelled toy objects' (navigational/nonnavigational or efficient/inefficient) behavior remained the same in a changing environment.
Goal-efficiency condition. The procedures in the goalefficiency condition were similar to that used in navigational agency condition. Each dog was shown plush toy T A that made a detour around a barrier while moving toward the goal object (showing efficient goal-directed behavior). Similarly, to the navigational agency Condition T A alternated its trajectory between trials providing a further cue of agency. Dogs were also shown another entity (T NA ) making the same detour as T A in the navigational agency condition. Importantly, before the trials with T NA E1 moved the obstacle away to the side of the scene so that it was not blocking the movement pathway of T NA , making the detour unnecessary. To facilitate goal ascription in the goal-efficiency condition, a goal object (a ball) was placed at the final position that was approached and contacted by both plush toys.
We assumed that the presence of a visible goal object was necessary to induce the attribution of efficiency based goaldirected agency because all previous demonstrations of goal attribution in preverbal infants (Csibra, 2008; Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Gergely et al., 1995; Phillips & Wellman, 2005) as well as nonhuman primates (Buttelmann et al., 2008; Rochat et al., 2008) involved contacting a visible target object.
Test trials (n ‫؍‬ 2). E2 placed the opaque occluder between the dog and the experimental setup. Then, E1 left the room, and both the RC car and the obstacle were removed from the scene. The two plush toys (T A and T NA ) were placed on the left and the right side on the floor in front of the dog by E2 who then went back and stood behind the dog. The side (i.e., left/right position) of T A and T NA in the test phase was counterbalanced between dogs. After the occluder had been removed by E2, the dog was allowed to make a choice, by approaching and/or touching one of the two toys. The test trial was then repeated once more, however, before this E2 placed the opaque occluder between the dog and the experimental setup again, and then changed the position of T A and T NA . Thus, the dog could not rely on spatial cues in the second test trial. The procedure was approved by the Ethical Committee for Animal Experimentation of Eötvös Loránd University and conducted in accordance with the national laws regulating animal research.
Data collection and analysis. The whole procedure was videotaped and subjects' choice behavior in the test trials was analyzed later. In the observational learning phase a trial was considered successful if the subject turned toward the apparatus during the crucial periods of the demonstration (i.e., when bumping, detouring or goal attainment happened). A dog was excluded from further analysis if (a) it did not pay attention during the first two trials, (b) or did not pay attention during the important periods of the demonstration in at least four out of the eight trials of the observational learning phase (when detouring, bumping or goalapproach happened), (c) or the subject did not choose a target in the first test trial for 60 s, or (d) there was an experimenter error, or (e) the owner influenced the dog's choice, or (f) problems occurred with accurately controlling the remote control toy car (therefore it is bumped in to the obstacle or moved inefficiently when the opposite was expected). A target object was regarded as chosen by the subject if the dog touched it with its paw/muzzle or at least approached it (its muzzle was closer than 10 cm to it).
To assess interobserver agreement, a second coder blind to the demonstration condition scored 100% of the test trials. Interrater reliability was perfect in the navigational agency condition (Cohen's : 1.0) and it was almost perfect in the goal-efficiency condition (Cohen's : 0.95).
Results
Dogs in the navigational agency condition showed an above chance preference in both test trials for the distally sensitive object T A that had avoided colliding with the obstacle blocking its way, over the other object, T NA , which regularly bumped into the obstacle showing no distal sensitivity to the environment (first test trial: n ϭ 20, p ϭ .04; second test trial: n ϭ 18, p ϭ .03, two-tailed sign test). After having selected T A in the first test trial, dogs consistently chose it again in the second trial (n ϭ 13, p ϭ .02, two-tailed sign test) as well. Among the dogs that chose the same plush toy consistently in both trials, preference toward the navigational agent over the nonagent, was significantly above chance (n ϭ 13, p ϭ .02, two-tailed sign test).
There was no significant difference in dogs' preferential choice behavior in the goal-efficiency condition (first test trial: n ϭ 20, p ϭ .263.; second test trial: n ϭ 20, p ϭ .824, two-tailed sign tests). Sixteen dogs chose consistently either the efficient or the inefficient plush toy which was significantly above chance level (n ϭ 20, p ϭ .01, two-tailed sign test); however, there were no significant differences either between the numbers of dogs that chose the goal-efficient or the inefficient target agent consistently. From among the consistently choosing 16 dogs, 13 chose the plush toy which was the last they had seen to touch the tennis ball (this effect was significant: p ϭ .02, two-tailed sign test). This effect was also significant regarding the first choice in the full sample (p ϭ .04, two-tailed sign test). Dogs in their first choice significantly preferred the plush toy that last made contact with the tennis ball.
The difference between the navigational agency condition and the goal-efficiency condition was significant in the first test trial (n ϭ 40, p ϭ .02, two-tailed Fisher-exact test), however it did not remain significant in the second test (n ϭ 40, p ϭ .32, two-tailed Fisher-exact test). For a summary see Figure 1 .
Discussion
The results of the navigational agency condition suggest that dogs preferentially chose a self-propelled object exhibiting distal sensitivity to its physical environment (avoiding collision by makThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ing a detour around the obstacle) over the alternative object which showed no such sensitivity. We assumed that dogs are more willing to approach and inspect an object they recognize to be an agent rather than choosing a nonagent (see Gergely, Petró, Topál, & Miklósi, 2013; Kubinyi et al., 2004) . These findings suggest that dogs might be able to attribute navigational agency to moving objects on the basis of motion cues indicating distal environmental sensitivity and show a consistent preference for navigational agents over nonagents. The difference in consistent preference between the navigational agency condition (in which significantly more dogs chose T A than T NA consistently) and the goal-efficiency condition (in which dogs consistently preferred either T A or T NA ) suggests that consistent choice behavior in the latter condition cannot be attributed to the recognition of cues of goal-efficiency. Rather, it seems that dogs prefer the last plush toy seen touching the goal object, that is, the one that is associated more strongly with the ball at the time of choice due to a recency effect. Thus, although the consistency in preference was significant in both the goal-efficiency and the navigational agency conditions, dogs, nevertheless, failed to show evidence of differentiating and preferentially choosing between T A and T NA on the basis of cues of goal-efficiency. Moreover, in the goal-efficiency condition significantly fewer dogs chose the agentive toy first when compared to the navigational agency condition, suggesting that efficiency might not be a sufficient cue for dogs to induce agency attribution.
Experiment 2-The Effect of Bumping on Preferential Choice
In the navigational agency condition of Experiment 1, dogs' choice behavior was interpreted to reflect their attribution and preference for navigational agency (choosing T A over T NA ). However, an alternative account to explain this finding is the possibility that dogs, in fact, tried to avoid T NA in this forced choice task because repeatedly bumping into an obstacle may have scared them. This could form a negative emotional association with the "scary" colliding object that could result in dogs' subsequent tendency to avoid approaching T NA during the test phase. Because both explanations could account for the same result, a further experiment investigated whether dogs' preferential choice behavior could be induced by the negative emotional valence of a repeated bumping event. To control for this possibility, in this second experiment we contrasted a bumping plush toy (T Bumping or T B ) with a "nonbumping" one (T Non-Bumping or T NB ). T B approached and bumped into an obstacle blocking its straight path of movement and then stopped in each trial. In contrast, T NB exhibited the same forward movement stopping abruptly at the corresponding spatial position without, however, bumping into anything as the obstacle had been displaced to one side earlier in all trials.
We assume that if bumping and the subsequent negative emotional association in itself would result in an avoidance response, this should be revealed in dogs' preferential choice in this control condition as well. However, we hypothesize that dogs' behavior in Figure 1 . Procedure and results of Experiment 1. Dashes indicate the motion trajectory of targets mounted on a radio-controlled car. The Agent (T A ) always made a detour around the obstacle and without a pause reached the end location in the navigational agency condition or contacted a goal object at the same location in the goal-efficiency condition. The Non-agent (T NA ) bumped into the roadblock in the navigational agency or stopped abruptly at the same location in the goal-efficiency condition without an obstacle being in its way. Then, in both conditions, T NA reversed its direction of movement, stopped again, moved forward once more and made a detour to reach the end location or the goal object. Bar graphs next to the different conditions represent the number of dogs selecting the given target in the first (Test 1) and second (Test 2) trial. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Experiment 1 was not driven by an avoidance response, therefore they will select among the target objects randomly.
Method
Subjects. Adult pet dogs (n ϭ 25) were recruited from the same database as in Experiment 1 using the same selection criteria. Dogs were excluded from the experiment either due to inattention (n ϭ 1) during the observational learning phase or because they failed to select from among the target objects in the first test trial (n ϭ 1). Additional dogs were excluded from the final analyses because of a technical problem with the radio-controlled car (n ϭ 1), experimenter error (n ϭ 1), or because the owner did not act in line with instructions (n ϭ 1). Twenty dogs were included in the final analyses (9 males; age: M Ϯ SD ϭ 2.65 Ϯ 1.46 years; nine different breeds).
Apparatus. Dogs were tested with the same apparatus and at the same place as in the navigational agency condition in Experiment 1.
Procedure. In this experiment there were no familiarization trials and we did not use a target object (ball) during the trials because there was no need to elicit goal-ascription. In the observational learning trials, although the start points of the motion trajectories were the same as in Experiment 1, the motion trajectories and their endpoints differed from it. Thus, after leaving the start point and moving approximately 1.2 m straightforward, T B always bumped into the roadblock and then immediately stopped. Before the trials with T NB E1 moved the obstacle to the side of the scene thus it did not block the way of T NB . The nonbumping T NB moved along the same trajectory as T B , but approached the obstacle from the opposite direction and stopped when it was next to the roadblock. Consequently, from the dog's perspective T NB was seen in front of the obstacle but unlike T B , T NB never bumped into it. Importantly, the procedure of the test phase was exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Between all the trials, dogs were prevented from witnessing the rearrangement of the scene by using the opaque occluder.
The procedure was approved by the Ethical Committee for Animal Experimentation of Eötvös Loránd University and conducted in accordance with the national laws regulating animal research.
Data collection and analysis. Data collection and analysis was the same as in Experiment 1. To assess interobserver agreement, a second coder blind to the demonstration condition scored 100% of the test trials. Interrater reliability was almost perfect (Cohen's : 0.95).
Results
Dogs in Experiment 2 did not show significant preference either toward T B or toward T NB . A two-tailed sign test revealed that dogs were choosing at chance level (first test trial: n ϭ 20, p ϭ 1; second test trial: n ϭ 19, p ϭ 1). There was no consistent preference for either of the target objects in the test trials.
Discussion
We did not find any significant selection bias effect in Experiment 2. This result rules out the alternative explanation that may have accounted for dogs' preferential choice in the navigational agency condition as being due to an active avoidance of the "scary" colliding target object. This further corroborates the interpretation that dogs' preferential choice in the navigational agency condition has been driven by their expectation that navigational agents show distal sensitivity to the environment.
Although, one could argue that dogs should select the nonbumping T NB in Experiment 2 as it showed no evidence for the lack of navigational skills, it is important to note that neither T NB nor T B provided movement cues indicating distal sensitivity to the environment. In contrast to T A in Experiment 1, the two self-propelled objects in Experiment 2 never make a detour around obstacles to actively avoid bumping into them but simply went straightforward then stopped. It is possible that this was not sufficient for dogs to attribute agency, therefore dogs were not able to differentiate between T NB and T B .
Experiment 3-Sensitivity to Navigational and Goaldirected Agency in Toddlers
Dogs' ability to recognize navigational agency raises the possibility that this ability may have been selected as a species-typical cognitive skill that helps dogs to identify navigational agents and differentiate them from nonagentivemoving objects. At the same time, we found no evidence in Experiment 1 to indicate that dogs would possess the higher level concept of efficiency based goaldirected agency that previous research has demonstrated to be available to human infants (Gergely & Csibra, 2003) . To further investigate this issue, we tested human toddlers using the novel paradigm we developed for testing different levels of agency understanding in dogs in Experiment 1. Earlier studies (using different methods) showed human infants to be sensitive to action efficiency in relation to distal goals (Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Phillips & Wellman, 2005) . Thus, we predicted that if our novel procedure is a sufficiently sensitive test to diagnose efficiency based differentiation of goal-directed agency, we should be able to demonstrate this capacity in toddlers as well. Such a demonstration would also strengthen the interpretation that dogs' failure to differentiate goal-directed agency when tested by the same procedure may indeed reflect a genuine lack of understanding of the higher level concept of efficiency based goal-directed agency.
Method
Subjects. We tested 18-month-old toddlers (n ϭ 58) in Experiment 3 who-according to their parents-did not have prior knowledge about radio controlled cars. Toddlers were excluded from Experiment 3 because they failed to select among the target objects in the first half of the test trials (navigational agency, n ϭ 4; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 7). Additional subjects were excluded from the final analyses because of technical problems (navigational agency, n ϭ 1), experimenter error (navigational agency, n ϭ 1; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 2), or because the caregiver did not act in line with instructions (goal-efficiency, n ϭ 3).
We included 40 toddlers in the final analyses. They were evenly distributed over the two conditions (navigational agency, n ϭ 20, 9 boys; age: M Ϯ SD ϭ 544 Ϯ 8.08 days; goal-efficiency, n ϭ 20, 9 boys; age M Ϯ SD ϭ 551.8 Ϯ 9.07 days). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Apparatus. Subjects were tested at the Cognitive Development Center, Central European University in a soundproof room (5.0 m ϫ 3.0 m) for behavioral infant and toddler studies. In the goal-efficiency condition we used a plush ball as a goal object .
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 3 was similar to that of Experiment 1; however, because we adapted the paradigm to toddlers' abilities, a few modifications were made. First, E1 hid behind a curtain next to the experimental objects during the observational learning trials to avoid the distraction of the subject. Between trials instead of using an occluder E1 simply pulled two curtains together to hide the rearrangement of the objects behind it. Therefore, in Experiment 3 there was only one experimenter in the testing room besides the subject and her caregiver, because there was no need of an additional experimenter to occlude the setup between trials. We also assumed that toddlers have the ability to take part in longer experiments than dogs without losing their interest, therefore they were provided with four test trials in each condition. The test trials were otherwise identical to that used in dog studies (Experiment 1 and 2). The procedure was approved by the United Ethical Review Committee for Research in Psychology, Hungary.
Data collection and analysis. Data collection and analysis was the same as in Experiment 1 except that a preferential choice was coded on the basis of which plush toy was touched first or, if the subject did not touch either of the objects, which plush toy was pointed at first.
Results
Toddlers in the navigational agency condition did not show an above chance preference for either the navigational agent T A or the nonagent T NA . (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, Z ϭ Ϫ1.299, p ϭ 0.227, r ϭ .205, two-tailed). Despite that, in the goal-efficiency condition they significantly preferred the goal-directed, efficient T A over T NA that exhibited unnecessary and inefficient detours on its way toward the target object (Z ϭ Ϫ2.495, p ϭ 0.016, r ϭ .394, two-tailed). The between condition comparison of toddlers' preference toward the plush toy that shows agency cues (either distal sensitivity to the environment or efficiency of movement during goal approach) yielded a significant difference (Mann-Whitney test, Z ϭ Ϫ2.537, p ϭ 0.011, r ϭ .365, two-tailed). In the goal-efficiency condition toddlers selected the agentive T A significantly more often than they did in the navigational agency condition (see Figure 2) .
We also compared dogs' and toddlers' performance in terms of their first two choices and found that dogs significantly outperformed infants in the navigational agency condition (Fisher's exact test, p ϭ .01, two-tailed) by selecting T A over T NA more frequently. However, there was no significant difference between the performance of the two species in the goal-efficiency condition when their first choices were compared (Fisher's exact test, p ϭ .26, two-tailed).
Discussion
In the navigational agency condition of Experiment 3 toddlers did not show a significant preference toward either of the selfmoving target objects. This result suggests that in the absence of a distal and visible goal object 18-month-olds have either not evaluated the difference between a navigational agent and a nonagentive moving object, or they did not find the difference relevant enough to motivate a preferential choice for one of them.
In contrast, dogs in a similar experimental setup showed a consistent bias to choose the navigational agent, therefore one could argue that the paradigm we used was suitable only for dogs and not for toddlers. However, this interpretation would also predict that no significant difference should be present in the goal-efficiency condition either in the case of toddlers. This was not the case, however, as toddlers showed a significant tendency to select the goal-efficient self-propelled entity over the nonefficient object in the goal-efficiency condition. This bias presumably reflects an agency preference and, in accordance with several infant studies (Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely et al., 1995; Phillips & Wellman, 2005) , it indicates that 18 month olds can also differentiate (and show preference for) instrumental agents that efficiently approach distal goals. These results imply that the paradigm we used is sensitive enough to test for the ability to recognize and attribute the higher level concept of instrumental agency on the basis of subtle cues of efficiency of goal approach.
The significant difference between conditions in the degree of preference toward T A suggests that toddlers might selectively attend to and predominantly rely on cues of action efficiency that need to be evaluated in relation to a distal goal object attributed to the agent. In contrast, they might attend much less to the cues of sensitivity to the environment when no distal goal has been assigned to the unfamiliar moving objects. Consequently, it seems that when evaluating instrumental agency humans first need to identify a distal target object as the potential goal in relation to which the relative efficiency of a means action can be assessed, as suggested by earlier studies with infants (Phillips, Wellman, 2005) . In the absence of a potential goal-object, toddlers may not engage in differentiating the actions performed by a navigational agent versus a nonagentive moving entity because the relative efficiency of their movements cannot be evaluated in relation to a distal goal-object as such has not been assigned.
The apparent bias to choose the efficient self-moving object in the goal-efficiency condition and the lack of preference for the navigational agent in the navigational agency condition in Exper- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
iment 3 represent the opposite pattern of results than what we found in dogs. One might argue that this suggests a species-typical mechanism for attributing instrumental goal-directed agency that is available to human infants but not to dogs. However, it should be pointed out that dogs had less opportunity to choose among the plush toys than toddlers, which could have biased the results with dogs at least in the goal-efficiency condition in which we found no significant difference between the two species' test performance in their first two choices. It is not impossible, therefore, that dogs would also have managed to demonstrate their agency preference in the goal-efficiency condition, had they received more test trials. Nevertheless, it might be crucial when interpreting our findings that dogs' choice behavior was significantly biased by a recency effect in the goal-efficiency condition. In the first test trial, dogs preferred to select the plush toy that they had last seen to touch the target-object and among those dogs that showed a consistent object preference this recency based bias was also significant in both trials. This may suggest efficiency-blindness in dogs similarly to the findings reported by Kupán et al. (2011) . Alternatively, it can imply that the recency effect was strong enough to override the preference induced by the goal-efficient agent. The latter interpretation would imply that the sensitivity to goal-efficiency might be rather fragile in dogs. Although both interpretations suggest that efficiency analysis is not a primary source of evidence for agency attribution in dogs, further studies will be needed to establish whether dogs are indeed lacking the ability to attribute instrumental agency by evaluating the efficiency of goal-directed behavior.
Regarding human toddlers, we raised the possibility that in the absence of a distal and visible goal object, they may not engage in evaluating the agency status of self-propelled objects they observe. Although toddlers have their own experience with bumping into objects, because of the above reason, they, presumably, perceived both self-propelled objects as a nonagents in the Navigational Agency condition, therefore they did not differentiate between the two. We found supporting evidence for this notion, suggesting that navigational skills could be relevant for dogs, but not for human toddlers.
General Discussion
Our results provide evidence that dogs can discriminate between agents and other self-moving entities on the basis of navigational agency. Dogs preferred a potential agent that exhibited distal sensitivity to the local environment over another that did not. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that dogs' preferential choice cannot be attributed to the negative emotional reaction induced by the experienced collision events. Moreover, the differences in the pattern of variability of motion trajectories cannot account for the preference toward the navigational agent in the navigational agency condition, because the exact same motion trajectory could not induce the same preference in the goal-efficiency condition.
These findings raise the possibility that unlike humans (e.g., Csibra, 2008; Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely et al., 1995) and nonhuman primates (Rochat et al., 2008; Uller, 2004) , dogs possess a more restricted agency concept allowing for the recognition of navigational agency that involves expectations of distal sensitivity to the local environment only. The dog is a member of the family Canidae and it is possible that as a function of their adaptations to their ecological niche dogs may have evolved a restricted concept of agency that captures sufficient information about the most relevant properties of the kinds of animate agents (from prey to conspecifics) that need to be identified and adaptively monitored to ensure survival. Such a conclusion, however, needs further investigation because the paradigm used in the present study might not be sensitive enough to demonstrate that dogs can attribute agency on the basis of goal-directed efficient behavior.
